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Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recogni-
tion, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital sta-
tus, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil
or any other field.
U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS
OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN'
A NARRATIVE FROM PROFESSOR REYNALDO ANAYA VALENCIA
In 1991, at the height of the Clarence Thomas confirmation debacle, I
was in full-time practice with a large international law firm while also
teaching Gender Discrimination as an adjunct professor at a regional law
school. Having graduated from law school only a year earlier, the Hill-
Thomas controversy was utterly enthralling for me as a newly minted law-
yer/law professor. Moreover, as someone with a long-standing interest in
and commitment to the areas of racial equality and gender equality, as
well as the related intersectionalities of these factors, and who was cur-
rently teaching a law school course in this area, I was compelled and vir-
tually required to follow the proceedings closely. Accordingly, while I
was away at work I videotaped many of the proceedings and then went
home each night to keep up with what had transpired throughout the day.
The fact that all of this activity occurred before I had yet to cover the
issue of sexual harassment in my Gender Discrimination course for the
semester was simply too much of a professorial dream. Although I did
not realize this at the time, such fortuitous happenstance moments are
what educators often refer to as a "teachable moment."' For me, the
Hill-Thomas controversy would become a true teachable moment in the
broadest sense of the term.
A year after the controversy broke, I walked into my Gender Discrimi-
nation classroom on the day that sexual harassment was the topic for the
1. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 34th Sess., 107 plen. mtg., Annex 1, at 194-5,
U.N. Doc. AJ34/L.61 (1979) (defining "discrimination against women"), available at http:II
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw [hereinafter CEDAW]. CEDAW is often described
as an international bill of rights for women. Consisting of a preamble and 30 articles,
CEDAW defines what constitutes discrimination against women and establishes an agenda
for national as well as international action to end such discrimination. To date, the United
States has failed to ratify CEDAW. See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction,
Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 659 (2001) (stating that the convention was
signed by President Carter, but has yet to be ratified by the Senate).
2. DICTIONARY OF EDUCATION 586 (Carter V. Good ed., 3d ed. 1973) (describing the
teachable moment as that "time when conditions for learning are optimum").
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class meeting. As a springboard for the class discussion I used a video-
tape of Professor Hill's opening testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in which she laid out all of her claims and grievances against
then-Judge Thomas. Following the videotape, I turned to the reading
materials for the day, consisting of some court opinions and law review
articles on the topic of sexual harassment. Afterwards, in order to get the
class discussion started, I decided I would randomly call on a student and
ask the student's views regarding Professor Hill and her allegations.
Completely oblivious to any politically charged context, I called on the
young woman directly in front of me in the first row of the classroom and
asked for her views regarding what we had covered thus far during the
class period. What happened next is singularly the most surprising and
difficult student revelation that has ever occurred in my over eleven years
as a legal educator.
Much to my surprise and amazement, the student began her response
to my inquiry by stating that the issue of sexual harassment was some-
thing that was very important and personal to her and that she probably
had a very different opinion and perspective from the rest of her class-
mates because she, herself, had been the victim of unwanted sexual har-
assment advances by one of the faculty members at the law school. The
student then very matter-of-factly proceeded to recount the whole
ordeal-including unwanted attention, touching, letters, notes, phone
calls, messages, gifts, etc.-for the entire class while I stood at the front of
the room utterly dumbfounded wondering how to handle this exceedingly
disturbing revelation. The teachable moment from the year earlier
seemed never-ending. While not naming the alleged perpetrator by
name, the student nevertheless provided many specifics about the person
such that although I as a relatively new adjunct professor had no idea
whom she was referring to, the other students in the forty-five member
class quickly identified the faculty member.
Following her revelation, several students asked numerous questions
and the student calmly responded to each one. The student also ex-
plained that at the time of the incident she told her best friend, a woman
who was also in the Gender Discrimination class and actually seated im-
mediately next to the student in question. Her best friend fully corrobo-
rated the entire ordeal for the class and further described the fear,
confusion, and frustration experienced by the student at the time of the
incident. The student concluded by explaining to the class that although
she had kept all of the evidence, including the notes and taped telephone
messages, ultimately she decided not to do anything about the incident,
and that she simply wanted to forget the whole ordeal because she did
not want the law school faculty to view her as a "troublemaker," and
thereby somehow possibly impede or otherwise affect her law school and!
or legal career. Quite honestly. I do not recall how the class meeting
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ended, other than we were all moved, disturbed and shaken by the stu-
dent's allegations and revelations.
The next day I returned to my full-time practice job where a few of the
full-time faculty members from the law school telephoned me to inquire
about the bombshell that had been dropped in my class the day before.
One professor who telephoned was specifically concerned and worried
about the student's fear that the faculty would somehow ostracize her
should she choose to come forward and do something about the incident.
This professor and I discussed what we felt was the best manner to con-
vey to the student, that should she determine to go forward, she would
not face a completely unsympathetic and/or hostile faculty, but rather
would have support from at least some of the faculty. The support that
the professor and I discussed was not so much to help the student topple
or ruin one of our fellow professional colleagues, but rather support of a
student in attempting to investigate and get to the truth of very troubling
allegations. At some point, I also recall discussing the issue with the dean
of the law school, who also urged me to communicate to the student that
should she go forward, the law school and university would treat her alle-
gations with complete discretion and utter fairness.
Despite all of this forthcoming support, the student ultimately deter-
mined that she did not want to go forward and file a formal complaint. In
the end, she was touched and relieved that at least some faculty were
sensitive to the entire issue, but remained concerned about subjecting
herself to the scrutiny of faculty, staff, and students at the law school.
In the almost decade following this incident, I have remained mystified,
troubled, and concerned as to why not only this student, but several other
students - both male and female - in different law schools where I have
taught and under different circumstances, have chosen not to proceed
with formal complaints in the context of what appear to be quite serious
situations of sexual harassment and gender discrimination. I understand
that the literature is replete with reports and an analysis of this "failure to
report" phenomenon regarding why very intelligent and accomplished
people in all types of work environments simply choose not to "make
noise" and forego initiating any formal proceedings to address their gen-
der based complaints.' Thus, when Miguel A. Ortiz, a then third-year
student in my Fall 2000 Gender Discrimination class at the St. Mary's
3. See, e.g., Shirley Feldman-Summers, Analyzing Anti-Harassment Policies and Com-
plaint Procedures: Do They Encourage Victims To Come Forward? 16 LAB. LAW. 307, 309
n.11-12 (2000) (discussing failure to report instances of sexual harassment); Donna Shes-
towsky, Note, Where is the Common Knowledge? Empirical Support for Requiring Expert
Testimony in Sexual Harassment Trials, 51 STAN. L. REV. 357 (1999) (discussing the role of
"failure to report" in lawsuits explaining why expert testimony is necessary on the issue).
Professor Lucie E. White has observed:
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University School of Law in San Antonio, Texas, suggested conducting a
survey of the St. Mary's law student community on the issue of sexual
harassment and gender equality in general as the basis for his class paper,
I not only encouraged his proposal, but supported it wholeheartedly.
What follows, therefore, is an edited and revised version of Miguel's
findings.4
This collaborative work, which began as Miguel's student project, pro-
vides some insight into how-despite the unquestionable consciousness-
raising of the Hill-Thomas hearings on this issue'-sexual harassment and
gender equality remain a challenge in contemporary American legal edu-
cation and American society in general. Importantly, however, since this
work began as a student survey at one law school at one particular point
in time, we do not mean to suggest or imply that these findings are illus-
trative of what is transpiring throughout greater United States society 07
[A] range of evidence supgests that women and other subordinated groups do not in
fact participate in legal proceedings as frequently or as fluently as socially dominant
groups. The work of Kristin Bumiller documents how women and minorities injured
by discrimination often choose to forego legal remedies, rather than risk the trauma
that they expect courtroom exposure to entail. A few case studies look closely at what
happens when women dare to bring gender-linked injuries into court. And a growing
body of empirical work broadly surveys the experiences of women in court . , . and
concludes that, in all of these roles, many women continue to perceive themselves to
be an unwelcomed presence in the courtroom.
Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Votes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFFALO L. REV. 1. 20 (1990) (citations omitted).
4. Given the stereotype of the macho Latino male. it is worth noting the perhaps
ironic, if not at least interesting, fact that unlike the vast majority of legal scholarship focus-
ing on gender, this work results from the collaborative efforts of two Latino men-a Pu-
erto Rican male student who sought and obtained permission and guidance from his
Mexican-American male professor for a class project. For a general discussion of mach-
ismo in Latino culture, see, e.g.. MtY MACHO (Ray Gonzalez, ed. 1996); Reynaldo Anaya
Valencia, On Being an "Out" Catholic: Contrertualizing the Role of Religion at LatCrut 11, 19
UCLA CHICANo-LATINO L. REV. 449. 460-466 (1998) (discussing the role of the Catholic
church in perpetuating and reinforcing notions of machisino in Mexican-American
culture).
5. Not surprisingly, the Hill-Thomas controversy spawned an avalanche, indeed a
plethora of publications-much too numerous to even attempt to catalog here-focused on
the issue of sexual harassment and providing critical analysis of this transformative mo-
ment in American history. One of the more important of these works is a book co-edited
by Professor Hill herself. Published in 1995. THE LEGACY OF MhE Hiut-THot.As Hi- .R.
INGS: RACE, GENDER AND POWER IN AMERICA (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jor-
dan, eds.) has as its genesis a conference held at the Georgetown University Law Center in
October 1992, a year after the controversy. The contributors to the book are the confer-
ence participants. including Professor Hill. whose first published essay on this matter is
included and titled Marriage and Patronage in the Empowerment andf Dtsempowernent of
African American Women. Id. at 271. Another important work is obviously Professor
Hill's own book on the controversy entitled SPEAKNo; TRtrrH 1o Po0%-aR (1997).
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American law schools as a whole. What this work does provide, however,
is some empirical basis for considering how and in what ways the issue of
sexual harassment and gender equality continues to be a challenge nearly
a decade after the Hill-Thomas hearings.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is undeniable that the status of women in greater American society
has improved dramatically since the 1960s. While these changes have re-
sulted from a combination of continuing demographic shifts, efforts of
women's and other progressive organizations, governmental policies and
increased social consciousness, continuing challenges remain-particu-
larly with respect to the hallmark socio-political institutions in which
power and influence is concentrated in contemporary U.S. society. De-
spite these roadblocks, however, the struggle for gender equality persists
and remains an on-going battle to suppress the negative impact of gender
discrimination. Like all struggles for civil rights in the United States, the
fight for gender equality is ultimately an effort to make real the Declara-
tion of Independence's articulated, and oftentimes unrealized, lofty aspi-
ration that all people-not only men-be treated equal.
This work reports the findings of a survey of law students conducted at
St. Mary's University School of Law (St. Mary's Law) in San Antonio,
Texas, in the Fall 2000 semester. Modeled after and developed largely
from a similar survey structured and utilized by the United States Merit
Systems Protection Board to measure the issue of sexual harassment in
the federal workforce,6 the survey measured the attitudes of St. Mary's
law students on a variety of gender-related issues.7 The 150 student sam-
ple consisted of the following three survey groups: 1) one section of the
first year students (67 students), 2) one "core ' course of second and
6. See U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN -ruE FED-
ERAL WORKPLACE, TRENDS, PROGRESS AND CONTINUING CHALLENGES (1995).
7. In this respect, this work is similar to, but differs from, the rich literature involving
the experiences of women in legal education and in the legal profession. See, e.g., ABA
COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: THE EXPERIENCES OF
WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION (1996); Ann Bartow, Still Not Behaving Like Gentlemen, 49
U. KAN. L. REV. 809 (2001); Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Exper-
iences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (1994). While the St. Mary's
Law Survey inquired into women's experiences in law school and expectations for career
advancement following graduation, the instant survey also queried other similarly impor-
tant and difficult areas. All views, opinions and/or commentary contained herein are those
of the authors' only, and are in no way meant to suggest and/or reflect the opinions, policy
and/or beliefs of St. Mary's University, its faculty, or staff. The questionnaire survey and
resulting data are on file with author Miguel Ortiz.
8. See ST. MARY'S UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, ST. MARY'S UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
LAw: STUDENT HANDBOOK 5 (Aug. 2001) (describing the "core" courses offered at St.
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third year students (48 students), and 3) one "'perspective"' course of sec-
ond and third year students (35 students). A total of sixty-nine men and
eighty-one women from the three survey groups participated in the final
survey.
While a thorough treatment of the legal and theoretical framework for
the areas surveyed is beyond the scope of this work, each of the following
sections nevertheless begins by providing enough such background to
help frame, contextualize and understand the survey's findings. Part II of
this work will discuss the survey's findings with respect to gender equality
within the legal profession. Part III discusses the survey's findings re-
garding sexual harassment within the government and private workforce.
Part IV addresses the survey's findings with respect to the issue of rape
and the increasing rate of this act of violence. Part V provides an over-
view of the survey's findings with respect to the issue of domestic vio-
lence. Part VI will discuss the survey's findings regarding abortion and
other reproductive rights issues. Finally, Part VII provides some conclud-
ing thoughts and observations.
II. GENDER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Even in the United States where equality of opportunity is arguably
closer at hand than in most parts of the world, it is nevertheless often
difficult for women to enter into the professional sector. Moreover, even
if women are successful in breaking into the traditional industries of
power, it is oftentimes still more difficult for them to advance as quickly
and to the same degree as their male counterparts,' and the fact remains
that women are often paid less than men for the same work." With re-
spect to the legal profession, the news is somewhat encouraging. For ex-
ample, in 2001 for the first time in U.S. history, women comprised over
one half of all entering students in the nation's law schools.' 2 Neverthe-
less, women law graduates have a more difficult time obtaining employ-
Mary's Law, including: all first year courses [i.e.. Property. Contracts. Torts. Criminal Law.
Constitutional Law, and Federal Procedure]: Professional Responsibility: E% idence, and
Texas Civil Procedure).
9. See id. (describing the "perspective- courses offered at St. Mary's La' including.
but not limited to: Race, Racism & American Law; Laws in Radically Different Cultures:
Law and Literature, and Legal Philosophy).
10. See, e.g., FEDERAL GLASS CEILNG COMMISSION. Go)n iou R Bt vc : NI ,.i'.t,
FULL USE OF THE NATION's HUMAN CAPITAL 143-155 (1995).
11. See generally Kristin McCue & Manuelita Ureta. Women in the Workplace Recent
Economic Trends. 4 TEX. J. WOMEN AND L. 125 (1995).
12. See, e.g., Kristin Choo, Tihe Right Equation: Despite Increasing Numbers of Female
Lawyers, Gender Equality May Not Be Guaranteed in the Future. ABA J.. Aug. 20U1, at 58:
Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Women in tie Legal Profession at t/re Turn ofthe Twents-First Cen-
tury: Assessing Glass Ceilings and Open Doors. 49 U. KAN. L. Ruv. 733. 741 (20M).
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ment with the largest, most prestigious and highest-paying law firms. t3
And, the few who succeed in obtaining associate positions in these work
settings face a more difficult time than men in being promoted to a part-
nership position. In New York City, for example, 17% of male associates
hired after 1981 made partner compared to only 5% of female associ-
ates. 4 This is only one of several statistics that illustrate why 94% of all
women who started working at New York City's top law firms in 1987
have since left their jobs. 15
Despite such shortfalls, today women have dramatically increased their
membership in state bar associations throughout the United States, but
are still far from achieving parity with their numbers in the general popu-
lation. In 1982, for example, women comprised only 13% of the State
Bar of Texas.' 6 Today, women's membership has increased to over 27%
in this organization, 17 but career opportunities may remain limited. For
instance, as exemplified by the most recent figures provided to the Na-
tional Association of Law Placement by the three major Texas-based law
firms-Baker Botts, Fulbright & Jaworski, and Vinson & Elkins-many
large law firms have approximately equal numbers of men and women
associates, but this equality in the lower ranks virtually disappears at the
partnership ranks.'8 For example, as of February 1, 2001, Baker Botts
reported a total of 255 attorneys in its Houston office: 79 male associates
and 62 female associates, and 87 male partners and 12 women partners.' 9
Similarly, Fulbright & Jaworkski reported a total of 354 attorneys in its
Houston office: 70 male associates and 30 female associates, and 111 male
13. See Wynn R. Huang, Comment, Gender Differences in the Earnings of Lawyers, 30
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 267, 271-72 (1997); Amy Bach, Life v. The Law, N.Y. MAU.,
Dec. 11, 1995, at 50. See generally Ann J. Gellis, Great Expectations: Women in the Legal
Profession, A Commentary on State Studies, 66 IND. L.J. 941, 947-49 (1991) (analyzing the
salaries of women lawyers compared with their male counterparts).
14. See Bach, supra note 13, at 50.
15. See id.
16. See CAROL CANNON & KEVIN J. PRIESTNER, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, STATISTICAL
PROFILE OF THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS MEMBERSHIP (2000-01) 2 (2001). At that time,
13% constituted less than 5,000 female attorneys in Texas. See id.
17. See id. Women are projected to comprise approximately 34% of the State Bar of
Texas by 2005. See id.
18. See NAT'L ASS'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS
(2001). It is important to note that while this section focuses on these three firms, they
were chosen only because they constitute a major legal presence in Texas. Similar, and
perhaps more disturbing, data can be gleaned from virtually every major law firm in Texas
and throughout the United States. In this regard, therefore, these three firms are no
worse, and in many instances far better, than their counterparts in terms of women in
higher echelons of power.
19. See id. at 1650.
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partners, and 12 women partners.20 Additionally, Vinson & Elkins re-
ported a total of 392 attorneys in its Houston office: Ill male associates
and 73 women associates, and 152 male partners, and 30 women
partners.21
These disparities apparently begin early in the law graduate's career.
For example, a recent study of new lawyers conducted by the State Bar of
Texas found that while 62% of the overall Class of 2000 graduates were
employed, the percentage for men was 67%, compared to 56% for wo-
men.2 Moreover, despite their work situation, most women are still ex-
pected to maintain their workload within the home in addition to their
jobs in the workforce.3 Such expectations derive from the still pervasive
belief that most domestic work is "women's work. ' 24 Because such tasks
are usually performed by women and do not produce any income, "wo-
men's work," such as housework and child-rearing, often go unrecognized
as work.25 All of this contributes to the continuing challenges that to-
day's law students-both male and female-face with respect to a more
balanced male/female student body and legal profession which will hope-
fully better reflect and appreciate the contributions of women.2
St. Mary's Law Survey Results
With all of the foregoing as a backdrop, the survey respondents were
asked whether they believed gender would play a roll with respect to
their chances for employment. Not surprisingly, 74% of the females
agreed that gender would play a roll in their chances for employment,
whereas only 44% of the men agreed.27
With regard to whether these students believed that men dominate the
legal profession, 60% of the men and 84% of women agreed. It appears,
therefore, that the male survey respondents are quite aware of their privi-
leged position within the legal profession. On the other hand, it should
20. See id. at 1654.
21. See id. at 1676.
22. See CYNTHIA L. SPANHEL & KEVIN J. PRIESTUNER. STATE BAR Or TLx.xs CLass
OF MAY 2000: EMPLOYMENT REPORT 2 (2001).
23. See MARILYN WARING. THE EXCLUSION OF WOMEN FROM -WORK" ANt) OPPOR-
TuNrTY IN HuMAN RiGHTs IN THE TVENTry-FIRsr CEN"TURY: A GLOBAL CIIALUtN(it, 109,
111 (Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul Mahoney eds.. 1993).
24. See id. at 111, 116-17.
25. For example, in Houston, Texas. a lawyer who chose to breastfeed her newborn
child during a deposition drew a harsh reaction from her male opponent, specifically a
"[m]otion to exclude gurgling infant and motion for protection" that made headlines.
Debra Cussens Moss & Mark Curriden, Baby Talk. ABA J., Dec. 1994. at 42.
26. See generally, Epstein, supra note 12.
27. Sixty percent of the overall population participating in the survey agreed, The
highest percentages were found among the African-Americans with 86%.
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Americans
FIGURE I: WILL GENDER AFFECT FUTURE EMPLOYMENT?
be noted that as the students progressed in their legal education, the per-
centage agreeing that men dominate the legal profession increased from
42% of the first year students to 62% of second and third year law stu-
dents.28 Moreover, 52% of the men disagreed, compared to 60% of wo-
men who agreed, that men have better opportunities to get a job
regardless of their academic standing and qualification. Importantly, a
full 78% of the total participants (69% of the men and 85% of the wo-
men) disagreed with the statement that men are more academically and
professionally capable as law students and lawyers.
Some of the more interesting questions in this part of the survey in-
quired as to the respondents' reactions to a report in the January 1996
ABA Journal.29 According to the report, a female lawyer from New
Jersey used sexual appeal as a tool to enhance her legal practice by ap-
pearing in various advertisements in a sexually provocative manner.30 In
the article, the attorney claimed that as a result of such advertising, her
legal practice increased by a significant amount.31 The attorney ex-
plained that her actions were in response to a male-dominated area of the
law (business), and believed that her actions were personal in nature and
should in no way be a reflection of or cause for underestimating women
28. Perhaps the change is due to the increasing exposure to the legal community and
the better understanding of the current problems therein.
29. See Brian Sullivan et al., Blond Ambition: Leggy Lawyer Poses, Profits, ABA J.,
Jan. 1996, at 12.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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lawyers in general.3 2 When asked whether they agreed with this lawyer's
beliefs and assertions, the survey respondents generally disagreed.
30.
25. z
20.
10.1
Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Do not
Agree Opinion Disagree know
FIGURE II: ATrORNEY'S ACrIONs REFLE(I ONLY oN HER?
Moreover, while some might expect women respondents to be more
sensitive and/or empathetic to the New Jersey attorney's solution for
combating what she considered unfair gender discrimination, 49 of all
women respondents either disagreed in part or in whole with her ap-
proach. Interestingly, an additional 26% of women respondents indi-
cated they had no opinion on the issue. In general, the overall results to
this part of the survey indicate that both men and women, but women to
a larger extent, perceive the legal profession as continued to be marked
by inequities in opportunities for male and female law students and
lawyers.
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Even before the Hill-Thomas hearings, the issue of sexual harassment
had already gained national prominence as a result of successful efforts
by feminists and other civil rights activists to move the issue to the fore-
front of American consciousness. Indeed, pursuant to the requirements
of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,11 the United States Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board was charged with conducting periodic, wide-rang-
ing studies to examine the issue of sexual harassment in the federal
workforce.34 Thus far, the Board has conducted such studies and issued
reports in 1980, 1987, and 1995. The most recent report, Sexual Harass-
32. See id.
33. 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(3). (e)(3) (1994).
34. See id.
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ment in the Federal Workplace: Trends, Progress and Continuing Chal-
lenges,35 was published in October 1995, and updated the findings of the
1980 and 1987 studies. In his transmittal letter to the President and the
Congress accompanying the 1995 report, the Chairman of the U.S. Merit
Systems Protection Board concluded, "The results of the current study
indicate that unwanted sexual attention remains a widespread problem in
the Federal sector. At the same time, however, Federal agencies have
made strides in educating their workforces and raising the level of sensi-
tivity to the issues surrounding sexual harassment."36
Concomitant with the U.S. government's attempt to monitor and assess
the issue of sexual harassment within the federal workplace, legal claims
involving sexual harassment began making their way to and through the
courts. In 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its first
sexual harassment ruling in the landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson.37 In Meritor, the Court determined that, "[tihe gravamen of any
sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwel-
come."' 38 Subsequent to Meritor, the Court has refined and defined
terms of art and further developed principles relating to legal liability in
this complex area of the law. 39
As previously noted, while an in-depth treatment of sexual harassment
law is beyond the scope of this article, the two general types of sexual
harassment recognized and actionable under current law need to be un-
derstood in order to appreciate the results of the survey at issue. The first
form of sexual harassment is referred to as "quid pro quo," and the sec-
ond is referred to as "hostile work environment." Quid pro quo sexual
harassment is fairly straightforward: conditioning employment decisions
(including hiring, firing, promotion, salary, etc.) on sexual behavior and/
or acts is illegal.4" The second form of prohibited sexual harassment is
35. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTEc'rIoN BOARD, supra note 6.
36. Id. at I.
37. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
38. Id. at 68.
39. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
510 U.S. 17 (1993). See generally Diana P. Scott, Latest Developments in Sexual Discrimi-
nation and Harassment, 49 A.L.I. 401 (Nov. 2000).
40. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 75 (1986); see also Michael J, Phil-
lips. Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Principles: A Second Look at
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1229 (1991); Eugene Scalia, The
Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 367
(1998); Ronald Turner, Employer Liability Under Title VII for Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment by Supervisory Personnel: The Impact and Aftermath of Meritor Savings Bank,
33 How. L.J. 1, 6 n.10 (1990).
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the so-called "hostile work environment," which is legally actionable
when an environment consists of conduct which is unwelcomed, based on
sex, and severe or pervasive enough "'to alter the conditions of the vic-
tim's employment and create an abusive working environment."'I This
standard, however, raises numerous additional questions such as what is
"unwelcome" conduct, when is such conduct based on sex, and whose
perception about whether behavior is appropriate or inappropriate
should be determinative?4 2 Indeed, even the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, whose guidelines on hostile work environment 3
served as the basis for the Meritor decision, 4 itself has declared: "Title
VII does not proscribe all conduct of a sexual nature in the workplace."'4
The distinction between acceptable sexual conduct and sexual harass-
ment, therefore, is highly dependent on the perception of the parties at
issue.
For example, in Harris v. Forklift Systens.4" the United States Supreme
Court declared:
When the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult,' that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment,' Title VII is violated.... "[Mlere utterance of
an ... epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee'
does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to impli-
cate Title VII. Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to
create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an envi-
ronment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is
beyond Title VII's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjec-
tively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not
actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment, and there
is no Title VII violation .... [W]hether an environment is 'hostile' or
'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances.
These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
41. Meritor. 477 U.S. at 67.
42. See generally Katrina Grider et al.. The Reasonable Woman Standard mn Hostile
Environment Litigation. TEx. B.J. 52 (1992).
43. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2001).
44. Meritor. 477 U.S. at 66.
45. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n. Polic, Guidance on Current Issues of
Sexual Harassment (Mar. 19. 1990). available at hnp://www.eeoc.go%/dols.currentssues.
html (last modified June 21. 1999): see also Katherine N1. Franke, What's Wrong wtth Sex-
ual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691. 709 n.85 (1997).
46. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance.47
St. Mary's Law Survey Results
As outlined above, contemporary sexual harassment law relies heavily
on distinctions and differentiations between welcomed and unwelcomed
sexual advances, behaviors and climate. Thus, understanding what the
actor intended and, perhaps more importantly, how the victim perceived
the conduct are all relevant areas of legal inquiry. On this point, the sur-
vey conducted at St. Mary's University School of Law drew from the
questions asked in the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board survey relat-
ing to perceived conduct which may constitute sexual harassment. More
specifically, the St. Mary's respondents were asked whether they would
classify the following five kinds of behavior as sexual harassment:
1. Uninvited letters, telephone calls, or materials of sexual nature.
2. Uninvited and deliberate touching, leaning over, cornering, or
pinching.
3. Uninvited sexually suggestive looks or gestures.
4. Uninvited pressure for sexual favors.
5. Uninvited sexual teasing, jokes, remarks.48
The St. Mary's Law survey asked respondents whether they considered
the above behaviors to constitute sexual harassment, if such behavior
were: 1) from a supervisor, 2) co-worker, or 3) a friend. The respondents'
answers to the survey are set forth below, and compared to similar survey
responses from U.S. federal government employees in the survey con-
ducted by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board.49
Percentage Who Considered It Harassment
St. Mary's Federal Gov't
Students Employees
From a Supervisor Men Women Men Women
Letters, telephone calls, or materials of sexual 78 89 87 94
nature.
Touching, leaning over, cornering, or pinching. 78 96 93 98
Sexually suggestive looks or gestures. 80 83 76 91
Pressure for sexual favors. 96 95 97 99
Sexual teasing, jokes, remarks, or questions. 73 89 83 73
47. Id. at 21-23 (citations omitted).
48. These questions were similar to those asked in the U.S. Merit Systems Protection
Board Survey. See U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD SURVEY supra note 6, at 61.
49. See id. at 7.
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From a Co-worker
Letters, telephone calls, or materials of sexual 63 81 81 92
nature.
Touching. leaning over. cornering, or pinching. 67 94 89 9t)
Sexually suggestive looks or gestures. 65 76 70 8
Pressure for sexual favors. 92 94 93 98
Sexual teasing, jokes. remarks, or questions. 64 83 64 77
From a Friend
Letters. telephone calls, or materials of sexual 29 50 NA N/A
nature.
Touching, leaning over. cornering, or pinching. 37 72 N/A N/A
Sexually suggestive looks or gestures. 42 52 N/A N/A
Pressure for sexual favors. 77 87 N/A N/A
Sexual teasing. jokes. remarks, or questions. 31 56 N/A N/A
FIGURE III
The 1995 U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board survey found that 44%
of female federal government workers and 19% of male federal govern-
ment workers reported being victims of unwanted sexual attention during
the two years preceding the survey. By comparison, the St. Mary's Law
survey found that 57% of the women and 37% of the men reported they
had been victims of one or more sexual harassment behaviors described
above within the last three years. Moreover, the results of both surveys
demonstrate that as the degree of personal relationship increased, the less
likely the respondents classified the behavior as sexual harassment. Fur-
thermore, as demonstrated in the data above, men in the St. Mary's Law
survey were more reluctant and less inclined than women to consider any
of the above behaviors sexual harassment-irrespective of whether the be-
havior was on the part of a supervisor, co-worker, or friend. This finding
would suggest that on the whole, the male respondents in the survey were
more willing to tolerate such behaviors. Indeed, this sentiment is best
exemplified by one of the respondents who commented, "It would be
nice to be wanted by the boss."
On another front, and consistent with the "failure to report" phenome-
non referred to in the introductory narrative to this article,' the respon-
dents to the St. Mary's Law survey revealed a disturbing reality that no
men, and only 20% of women, reported such harassment to someone
else. On a more positive note, 64% of male and 70% of female harass-
ment victims reported that eventually the harassment ceased. Interest-
ingly, 84% of the men and 51% of the women do not see themselves as
future victims of sexual harassment. These findings beg a more interest-
ing question: given that a large number of respondents reported being
50. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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victims of sexual harassment, why is it that the majority of these same
individuals did not see themselves as future victims?
On the other hand, in response to whether they would report such be-
havior if it happened to them in the future, 27% of the women and 35%
of men said that they would. Significantly, over one-half (51%) of the
women indicated that they would talk to the harasser first and see what
happens.
60. '10 Yes
O' Yes, unless it will jeopardize my
40. current and future job
30.1 -- 51 - 0 Maybe, will talk to the harasserfirst
32 28 C 0 No, I will take care of the
10. 3 1situation myself
0Ell Never
Men Women
FIGURE IV: WILL REPORT UNWANTED ADVANCES (BY GENDER)?
60- El Yes
50- 53 Yes, unless it will jeopardize
40.; my current and future job
30 - - Maybe, will talk to the harasserfirst
20' i 14 El No, I will take care of the
10 1 situation myself
0 0 Never
Age 20-29 Age 30-39 Age 40-49
FIGURE V: WILL REPORT UNWANTED ADVANCES (BY AGE)?
In a 1998 case, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 5 the Su-
preme Court issued its first sexual harassment ruling addressing the issue
of same-sex harassment. In Oncale, the Supreme Court determined that
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and the relevant caselaw pursuant thereto,52 finding no justifi-
51. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
52. See id. at 82. Justice Scalia delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, holding:
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cation in the statutes or any precedent for a rule excluding same-sex har-
assment claims from the coverage of Title VII." -
Respondents to the St. Mary's Law survey were asked if they agreed or
disagreed with the holding in Oncale. One of the survey's most encourag-
ing findings was that a clear majority of all students, 81% of the men and
93% of the women, agreed with the Oncale holding. While there was a
slight fluctuation depending on the respondent's year in law school, over-
all the results remained consistently high. The lowest level of agreement
with the Oncale decision, 76%, came from first year male students.
Finally, the St. Mary's Law survey also asked respondents whether the
government should enact laws to protect the rights of gays and lesbians.
As the following chart demonstrates, answers to this question varied
greatly among and between the groups of respondents.
While the vast majority of African Americans (8 6 %) agreed with the
enactment of legislation protecting gays and lesbians, this number is also
tempered by the fact that the pool of African American respondents to
the survey was quite small (7 total). Compared to the high approval rat-
ing of such laws among the small pool of African American respondents,
similar support was much lower from the other respondent groups. For
instance, only 49% of males and 77% of females agreed with such legisla-
tion. Disparities in the level of agreement on this issue were most appar-
ent when the answers were compared by the age of the respondents.
While only 36% of the respondents 40 years and older agreed with legis-
lation protecting the rights of gays and lesbians, a much higher 68% of
respondents age 20 to 29 agreed with such legislation. These findings sug-
gest that age is a significant factor in how students at St. Mary's Law
Harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of
discrimination on the basis of sex. A trier of fact might reasonably find such discrimi-
nation, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory
terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general
hostility to the presence of women in the workplace. A same-sex harassment plaintiff
may also, of course, offer direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser
treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace. Whatever evidentiary route
the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue
was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations. but actually constituted dis-
crimination because of ... sex.*
Id. at 80-81: see also Scott. supra note 39, at 426.
53. Oncale. 523 U.S. at 79. In so holding. the Court noted.
As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title
VII. But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our law-s rather than the princi-
pal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.
Id. (citations omitted).
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FIGURE VI: SUPPORT LEGISLATION PROTECTING GAYS AND LESBIANS
perceive and/or accept social change, with older individuals tending to be
more conservative in how society should view and protect gays and lesbi-
ans. Indicative of the continuing resistance to such equality are the com-
ments of one of the respondents who wrote, "a whole new set of rules?
... they [gays and lesbians] should just be treated by the laws the same
way men and women are."
IV. RAPE
During the Fall 2000 semester, when the St. Mary's Law survey was
administered, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) most recent
annual Uniform Crime Report (UCR)54 evidenced that between 1998
and 1999 the number of violent crimes reported in the United States de-
clined by nearly 7%.55 Similarly, the Bureau of Justice Statistics' (BJS)
annual National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)56 reported that the
violent crime rate had declined by 10% within the same time period.5 7
The UCR and the NCVS are two statistical programs administered by the
U.S Department of Justice to measure crime in the United States.58 Un-
like the UCR, the NCVS includes an examination of both reported and
unreported crimes. 9 Additionally, the NCVS, which was designed to
54. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999 UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS (1999), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius-99/99crime/99cius.pdf.
55. See id. at 10-11 (noting that the 1999 figure of 1.4 million reported crimes is the
lowest reported number since 1985).
56. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE'
STATISTICS: NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (Aug. 2000), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cr99.pdf.
57. See id. at 1, 3.
58. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. supra note 54, at 410.
59. See id. at 411: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 56, at 3.
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complement the UCR, includes an examination of sexual assaults in addi-
tion to forcible rapes.60
Although the UCR report revealed that the number of reported forci-
ble rapes declined by 4.3%,6 the NCVS report noted that 72% of rapes
or sexual assaults were never reported to the police."2 It also reported
that there was a 20% increase in the number of rapes and that sexual
assaults for the same period increased by 33.3%.". The report further
indicated that a devastating 69% of rape and sexual assault victims knew
their offender as an acquaintance, friend, relative, or intimate."'
In response to the report, Karen Baker. the Project Director of the
National Sexual Violence Resource Center (NSVRC), 5 stated:
While it is good news to see the overall rate of national crime victim-
ization decreasing, it is important to notice that rape and sexual as-
saults are not following that trend. This is not surprising, however.
We live in a society where many social and cultural influences pro-
mote sexual violence and lead to a generalized tolerance. In fact,
sexual assault permeates society deeply. A crime often cloaked in
denial, shame and fear, sexual assault is extremely difficult to con-
front and eliminate. 66
In 1997, researchers Laura L. O'Toole and Jessica R. Schiffman ob-
served, "[o]verwhelming evidence supports the contention that rape and
coercive sexual intercourse occur frequently and are, in fact, a common
experience for women in our culture." 7 Indeed, there is perhaps no
place where this reality is more pronounced than on the nation's college
campuses. In 1985, Ms. magazine surveyed approximately 7,000 students
from thirty-two university campuses around the nation and found that 1
60. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. supra note 54. at 411.
61. See id. at 64.
62. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS. supra note 56. at 11: se' also Press Release.
National Sexual Violence Resource Center. Overall Crime Victimization Rate Decreases
10% But Rape Increases 20% (Sept. 5. 2000) (noting that approximately 70% of sexual
assaults and rapes go unreported) (on file with author).
63. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS. supra note 56. at 3: set also Press Release,
National Sexual Violence Resource Center. supra note 62.
64. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS. supra note 56. at 1. S.
65. Press Release. National Sexual Violence Resource Center. supra note 62. The
NSVRC is dedicated to improving support systems for sexual assault survivors. See til. It
also serves as a central clearinghouse for resources for the anti-sexual violence initiative.
See id.
66. Id. For instance, according to an NSVRC estimate. I in 4 women and I in 6 men
will become the victim of a sexual assault during their life. See id.
67. GENDER VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PLRSI' 'Is'I:S (Laura L O'Toole & Jes-
sica Schiffman eds., 1997).
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in 8 female students had been raped.68 Further, the survey found that
one in every 12 men admitted to having forced a woman to have inter-
course or trying to force a woman to have intercourse through physical
force or coercion.69 Virtually none of these men, however, identified
themselves as rapists,7" and only 57% of the women who had been as-
saulted labeled their experience as rape.7' The other 43% had not even
acknowledged that they had been raped.72 In a separate study conducted
that same year, only 4% of approximately 38% of randomly selected uni-
versity women who experienced an assault which was legally definable as
rape or attempted rape reported the assault to the authorities. 73 Simi-
larly, in a 1987 study of more than three thousand college women, ap-
proximately 54% indicated that they had experienced some form of
sexual victimization-12% had experienced attempted rape, and 15% had
experienced rape.74 In a 1989 random sample of 481 college women, over
25% reported being coerced into non-consensual sexual activity at least
once during their years in higher education, and often more than once.7 5
In a 1992 study of 20 college students who were raped, none told the
police, and only 15% spoke with anyone about their ordeal.76 Finally,
after presenting its findings on a host of sexual victimization issues in the
college context-some of which are consistent with and some of which
are inconsistent with data from prior surveys-an extremely comprehen-
sive report issued in December 2000 by the National Institute of Justice,
nonetheless concluded that, "College campuses host large concentrations
of young women who are at greater risk for rape and other forms of sex-
ual assault than women in the general population or in a comparable age
group. ,77
68. See Ellen Sweet, Date Rape: The Story of an Epidemic and Those Who Deny It,
Ms., Oct. 1985, at 56, 56, 58.
69. See id. at 58.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 56
72. See id.
73. Mary P. Koss, The Hidden Rape Victim: Personality, Attitudinal and Situational
Characteristics, 9 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 193, 206 (1985).
74. Mary P. Koss et al., The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Ag-
gression and Victimization in a National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J. CON-
SULTING CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 162 (1987).
75. S. FENSTERMAKE, ACQUAINTANCE RAPE ON CAMPUS: RESPONSIBILITY AND A--
TRIBUTIONS OF CRIME IN VIOLENCE IN DATING RELATIONSHIPS (Maureen A. Piro-Good
& Jane E. Stets eds., 1989).
76. Crystal S. Mills & Barbara J. Granoff, Date and Acquaintance Rape Among a
Sample of College Students, 37 Soc. WORK 504, 506 (1992).
77. BONNIE S. FISCHER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SEXUAL VI(rlMIZA [ION
OF COLLEGE WOMEN iii (2000).
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Perhaps one of the most contentious findings in this area was a 1983
survey conducted at one of the most elite universities in the country,
Harvard University. In this survey, a startling 93% of the male students
surveyed answered "yes," when asked if "they had the chance and were
sure they would not get caught, they would consider forcing a women to
have sex without her consent."7
St. Mary's Law Survey Results
In 1991, Margaret T. Gordon and Stephanie Riger published their find-
ings regarding rape and women in the United States. In short, these re-
searchers' most disturbing findings came in thirds: one-third of women
surveyed indicated that they worried about being raped at least once a
month; one-third indicated that the fear of rape was "'always there:" and
one-third indicated that they never worried about the issue of rape, b-i
nevertheless reported taking precautions to avoid being the victim of a
rape.7 9
The survey conducted at St. Mary's University School of Law asked the
respondents how they would characterize their level of knowledge re-
garding the crime of rape. Fifty-five percent of the men and 75% of the
women rated their knowledge of rape as "good." An additional 3 6 % of
the men and 25% of the women rated their knowledge of rape as "fair."
The St. Mary's Law survey also asked whether the respondents, given
their knowledge and understanding of the relevant laws, believed that
contemporary laws adequately protect women from acts of rape and do-
mestic violence. Interestingly, while 57% of women believed that current
laws do not adequately protect women from acts of rape and domestic
violence, only 35% of the men agreed. A full 35% of the women respon-
dents, however, did agree that current laws protect women to some
extent.
Perhaps the difference between the men and women respondents with
respect to these questions is attributable to the different ways in which
women and men conceive of and experience, as evidenced through the
studies discussed above, the crime of rape. Susan Brownmiller in her
groundbreaking work in 1975 described this experential difference as
follows:
[T]he rapist performs a myrmidon function for all men by keeping all
women in a thrall of anxiety and fear. Rape is to women as lynching
was to blacks: the ultimate physical threat by which all men keep all
78. See Iris Bennett, Appalling Attitude Toward Rape, HARVARD CRIMtSOIN. Feb. 28,
1998 (commenting on results of a study of Harvard male students in 1983).
79. MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RiGER. TIE FFMAU- FtAR 21 (1991).
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FIGURE VII: RAPE AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAWS ADEQUATELY
PROTECT WOMEN?
women in a state of psychological intimidation. Women have been
raped by men, most often by gangs of men.., as group punishment
for being uppity, for getting out of line, for failing to recognize 'one's
place,' for assuming sexual freedoms, or for behavior no more pro-
vocative than walking down the wrong road at night in the wrong
part of town and presenting a convenient, isolated target for group
hatred and rage.80
V. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Anglo-American jurisprudence's historical treatment of and response
to the difficult issue of domestic violence is directly traceable to the En-
glish Common Law's notion of "coverture"-a concept under which a
married woman's legal existence was suspended and subsumed by that of
her husband's during marriage.81 The noted Sir William Blackstone,
whose Commentaries on the Laws of England,8 published in 1765 served
as a guiding authority for the development of much of American jurispru-
80. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975).
81. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAvS OF ENGLAND 430
(photo. reprint 1966) (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765); see also, e.g., Margaret J. Chriss,
Troubling Degrees of Authority: The Continuing Pursuit of Unequal Marital Roles, 12 LAW
& INEO. 225, 227-29 (1993); Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent. A Legal History of
Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (2000); John R. Johnston, Jr., Sex and Property:
The Common Law Tradition, the Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward
Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1045-46 (1972); Amy D. Ronner, Husband and Wife Are
One - Him: Bennis v. Michigan as the Resurrection of Coverture, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
129, 132 (1996).
82. BLACKSTONE, supra note 81.
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dence, explained, "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in
law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband."83 As a result of this suspension of identity, explained
Blackstone, and because the husband was therefore legally responsible
for almost all of her acts, "[t]he husband also (by the old law) might give
his wife moderate correction. For, as he is to answer for her [his wife's]
misbehavior, the law thought it reasonable to entrust him [the husband]
with this power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the same
moderation that a man is allowed to correct his servants or children. "'M
However, under the modem reign of Charles II, concluded Blackstone,
such mistreatment was frowned upon, except that "the courts of law will
still permit a husband to restrain a wife of her liberty, in case of any gross
misbehavior."85
Given this authoritative and entrenched historical basis, legal attempts
to address the issue of domestic violence in the United States were not
met with much success until the feminist movement's efforts in the 1960s
and 1970s.86 Ultimately, these successes progressed and culminated in an
effort to address this complex problem nationally at the federal level. Be-
ginning in 1990, the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator Jo-
seph Biden, convened a series of hearings "on the topics of rape,
domestic violence, and existing legal protections. "17 The results of these
hearings were summarized in a report issued in October of 1992 entitled,
Violence Against Women: A Week in the Life of America.' In this report,
the Senate Judiciary committee powerfully made its point regarding the
magnitude of the problem by documenting 200 incidents of violence
83. Id. at 430.
84. Id. at 432.
85. Id. at 433.
86. See, e.g., LINDA GORDON. HEROES OF THEIR OwN Livts: Tin- Pot riic s %%t HI-
TORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 253-54 (1989); SUSAN SCHEMI-TER. WOMLN .ND MAtt Vio-
LENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BAI"ITERiw Wo.%lt-.N NI. I '.I1- 29-52
(1982); Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Prva. 61 011O1
ST. L.J. 1, 4-6 (2000); Reva B. Seigel. -'The Ride of Love:" Wife Beating as Prerogatve and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J., 2117. 2118 (1996); Pamela M. Jablow. Note. Victni of Abuse and
Discrimination: Protecting Battered Homosexuals Under Domestic Violence Legishton, 28
HoFS-RA L. REv. 1095, 1098 (2000).
87. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE J'DIC IARY. 102D Co 'o.. S. PRI. 102-118, Vio
LENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF ANILRuRA IIl (Comm. Print 1992); see
also Ethan Bronner, Senate Panel to Address Rising Reports of Rape. Bosi'.o GI onr. Apr.
11, 1991, available at 1991 WL 7409041: Linda Chang. Er-Model Addresses Panel Slashing
Victim Speaks at Sex-Crime Hearing. DALLAS MORNING NFws. June 21. 1990. at 8A. avail-
able at 1990 WL 7344214: Helen Dewar. Women Back Biden Bill for Victuns: Domestic.
Street Violence Targeted, WASH. POST. June 21. 1990. available at 1990 WL 2124930
88. S. PRT. 102-118, supra note 87. at III.
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against women somewhere in the United States during the week of Sep-
tember 1, 1992.89 Sadly, concluded the report, "we believe the 200 inci-
dents below represents less than one one-hundredth of the actual violence
committed against women in a single week in America."90
The specific findings of the report largely reiterated what was generally
known about domestic violence, but these results were nevertheless quite
unsettling and discomforting. For instance, the report's "Factual Sum-
mary," reprinted in part below, pointed out the following:
" More than 1.13 million women are victims of reported domestic vio-
lence every year-by some estimates, as many as 3 million more do-
mestic violence crimes go unreported each year.
" More than 21,000 domestic assaults, rapes and murders were re-
ported to the police each week in 1991-twice the number of reported
robberies;
* Every week, more than 2,000 women are raped; if unreported rapes
are counted, the total may be as high as 12,000 per week;
" More than 90 women were murdered every week in 1991-9 out of 10
were murdered by men;[911
* Almost one-fifth of all aggravated assaults (20 percent) reported to
the police every week are reported by victims of assaults in the
home;
" Women are six times more likely than men to be the victim of a
violent crime committed by an intimate;
* Estimates indicate that more than one of every six sexual assaults in
a week is committed by a family member.'
Additionally, the report further noted that four years after the Surgeon
General's 1989 determination that violence was the primary public health
risk for adult women in the United States, the then-current Surgeon Gen-
eral Antonia Novello had recently determined that violence against wo-
men continued to remain the "leading cause of injuries to women ages
89. The report explains that, "These incidents were picked randomly from responses
to a telephone survey of over 200 rape crisis centers, domestic violence shelters, emergency
rooms and police stations." Id. at 9.
90. Id. (emphasis in original).
91. Additionally, 1990 FBI statistics indicated that approximately one-third of all wo-
men who were murdered were murdered by their boyfriends, husbands, or lovers. See
Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race,
National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J., 231, 231-32 (1994).
92. S. PRT. 102-118, supra note 87, at 1-2 (emphasis in original).
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15-44, more common than automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer
deaths combined."-93
Importantly, the results and findings of the report and congressional
hearings ultimately served as the impetus behind and basis for the propo-
sal and subsequent enactment of the Violence Against Women Act of
1994 ("VAWA"). 94 This legislation provides funding for educational pro-
grams, seeks to strengthen existing legislative protections and support for
victims of violence and domestic violence in particular, and adds addi-
tional legislative protections for such victims."5 Summarizing the state of
domestic violence law in 1999, Deborah Epstein, declared:
Despite numerous frustrations and failures over the past thirty years,
the domestic violence movement has made enormous strides. The
country has moved from a time when no term for intimate abuse
existed in the national lexicon to an era of substantial public aware-
ness and political will to intervene. Every jurisdiction has now en-
acted civil protection order legislation, and the vast majority of these
statutes authorize the essential relief necessary for battered women
to leave abusive relationships. These 'basics' include provisions for
emergency ex parte relief, so that victims have court-ordered protec-
tion during the potentially volatile period between the time of filing
a lawsuit and trial ... Modern laws governing civil protection orders
also authorize fairly comprehensive post-trial relief. In addition to
the basic provisions requiring the abuser to cease his assaults and
stay away from the victim, these orders may award temporary child
93. Id. at 3 (citing Surgeon General Antonia Novello. From tile Surgeon General L'.S.
Public Health Service, 267 J. Am. MED. ASS'N. 3132 (June 17. 1992)).
94. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-3". Title IV, 10S Stat.
1902 (1994) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 13981); see Senator Joseph R. Biden. Jr.. The
Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Defense. 37 HARV. J. oN LEWzs.
1, 5-6 (2000); Lisa A Carroll. Comment. Women's Powerless Took How Congress Over-
reached the Constitution with tile Civil Rights Renedy of the Violence Against Women Act,
30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 803. 804 (1997). During the Summer of 2000. VAVA was
reauthorized. See Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L No. 106-386. 114 Stat.
1464 (2000). For a general discussion of VAWA's reauthorization, see Lori Romeyn Sitow-
ski, Congress Giveth, Congress Taketh Awa;, Congress Fixeti Its Mtstake? Assessing tile
Potential Impact of the Battered Inligrant Women Protection Act of 2000, 19 Law & l'NEQ.
J. THEORY & PRAc. 259, 285-86 (2001).
95. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994. supra note 94; see also Leonard Karp &
Laura C. Belleau. Federal Law and Domestic Violence: Tile Legacy of the Violence Against
Women Act, 16 J. Am. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LNw 173. 179 (1999); Bryan J. Ormo. Com-
ment, Ending the Domestic Violence Cycle Through Victim Education in Oregon's Re-
straining Order Process, 33 WILUA, ElTrE L. REV. 971,993 (1997). Importantly, one of the
Act's major provisions allowing for a civil rights cause of action by a victim of gender-
related violence against her perpetrator was recently declared unconstitutional in United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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custody, safe visitation arrangements for the non-custodial parent,
and child support. Finally, 34 states have adopted criminal contempt
laws to help enforce protection orders, and 45 jurisdictions have
made violating a protection order a statutory crime.96
Despite the legal system's progress, however limited, in addressing the
issue of domestic violence, the disturbing reality is that this problem con-
tinues and may actually be on the rise. According to the National Vio-
lence Against Women (NVAW) survey conducted in 1995 and 1996," 7
nearly 22% of surveyed women and 7.4% of surveyed men said they were
raped and/or physically assaulted by a current or former spouse, cohab-
iting partner, or date at some time in their lifetime, and 1.3% of surveyed
women and .9% of surveyed men said they were raped and/or physically
assaulted by a partner in the previous twelve months.98 According to
these estimates, approximately 1.3 million women and 835,000 men are
raped and/or physically assaulted by an intimate partner annually in the
United States.99
Almost 5% of NVAW surveyed women and .6% of surveyed men re-
ported being stalked by a current or former spouse, cohabiting partner, or
date at some time in their lifetime, and .5% of surveyed women and .2%
of surveyed men reported being stalked by such a partner in the previous
twelve months.'00 Based on these estimates, "503,485 women and
185,496 men are stalked by an intimate partner annually in the United
States."' 1
The NVAW survey also found that women are significantly more likely
then men to report being victims of intimate partner violence whether it
is rape, physical assault, or stalking and whether the timeframe is the per-
son's lifetime or the previous twelve months."° Additionally, the survey
found that, in the months prior to the survey, women who were physically
assaulted by an intimate partner averaged 3.4 physical assaults by the
same partner, but men averaged 3.5 assaults. 10 3 Finally, the survey found
"that 41.5 percent of the women who were physically assaulted by an inti-
96. Deborah Epstein, Redefining the State's Response to Domestic Violence: Past Vic-
tories and Future Challenges, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 127, 127-143 (1999).
97. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPIORT
OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
(2000).
98. See id. at iv.
99. See id. at 26.
100. See id. at 27-28.
101. Id. at 28.
102. See id. at 25.
103. See id. at 26-27.
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mate partner were injured during their most recent assault," versus
19.9% of the men."°4
Despite the development and progress of domestic violence legislative
efforts, many victims nonetheless choose to remain in the abusive situa-
tion and/or refuse to leave their abuser. While such behavior may seem
rather counterintuitive. Dr. Nancy Faulkner's groundbreaking research in
this area has identified ten reasons why a woman may decide to stay in an
abusive relationship:10 5
1. Being afraid to lose a comfortable lifestyle.
2. Being blind to the point not to recognize the abuse or having been
so used to it that it is not seen as abuse.
3. Being afraid to be alone for the rest of her life.
4. Shifting the blame to herself: "I deserved it, I'll do better."
5. Assuming that she has the situation under control: "I can keep it
from happening again."
6. Assuming that it is an isolated situation: "'He's really sorry this
time, and it won't happen again."
7. Pretending that the situation is not as bad as it seems: "I know I
make him sound terrible, but he's really a good person most of
the time."
8. Justifying the abuser's behavior: "He didn't mean to hurt me."
"No one else understands him the way I do."
9. Justifying why not to report the problem: "But I love him."
10. Being afraid of the abuser: "He'll kill me if I try to leave him." '
Unfortunately, many women who remain in these lethally abusive rela-
tionships ultimately end up killing their abusers. One of the most per-
plexing problems for the U.S. legal system has been how to deal with
battered and/or abused women who commit such crimes. Oftentimes,
when these women have been charged with murder, they have sought to
introduce expert testimony relating to the "battered woman syn-
drome"' 107 as a means of availing themselves to the defense of self-de-
104. Id.
105. See NANCY FAULKNER, DomisTi- Viou N-t Wii-: Win ' o.un Si.r (1997), avall-
able at http://www.prevent-abuse-now.com/domviol.htin.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g.. Georgia Wralstad Ulmschneider. Rape and Battered Wotnen'3 SeIf-De-
fense Trials as "Political Trials:" New Perspectives on Feminists' Legal Reform Eftorts and
Traditional "Political Trials" Concepts, 29 StFFOLK U. L RL\'. 85. 92 n.54 (1995) (citng
CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE. JUSTIFIABLE HoMICID"i: BA rITRI-i) WoMEN. S _u-Drj i,.
THE LAW 157 (1989)): Rocco C. Cipparone. Jr.. Comment. The Defense of Battered Women
Who Kill. 135 U. PA. L. REV. 427. 429-31 (1987).
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fense.' °8 These efforts, however, have often been met by resistant courts
that are unwilling to find the "imminent danger" component typically
necessary for a self-defense to have been satisfied. °9 Historically, under
Anglo-American legal principles an individual seeking to avail him/her-
self of the defense of self-defense to combat the use of deadly force has
had to satisfy the "imminent danger" requirement. ° Because many wo-
men who kill their abusers do not typically kill in the "heat of the mo-
ment" of a violent episode, but rather wait until a later time, many courts
find that the "imminent danger" requirement is not met and refuse to
allow a defense of self-defense."'~
St. Mary's Law Survey Results
The survey conducted at St. Mary's Law found that 36% of the men
and 40% of the women respondents did not believe that women who are
victims of domestic violence and "choose" to remain in such an environ-
ment, are acting with free will. Comparatively, 26% of the men and 21%
of the women believed that, to some extent, the women did choose to
stay. Additionally, another 29% of the men and 31% of the women indi-
cated that they would have to look at the situation on a case-by-case basis
before deciding.
108. See, e.g.. People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996); State v. Norman, 378
S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989); see also Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 948, 950 n.2 (1984) (describing the
battered women's syndrome and its acceptance as a legal theory of self-defense).
109. See Humphrey, 921 P.2d; Norman 378 S.E.2d.
110. See, e.g., Humphrey, 921 P.2d, Norman, 378 S.E.2d; see also Donald L. Creach,
Note, Partially Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered Wife Kills and Tells Why,
34 STAN. L. Rav. 615, 616, 619 (1982); Sarah Baseden Vandenbraak, Note, Limits on the
Use of Defensive Force To Prevent Intramarital Assaults, 10 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 643, 644,
650-51, 658 (1979).
111. See Norman 378 S.E.2d at 16. However, not all courts have refused to relax or
reconceptualize the "imminent danger" requirement necessary for a self-defense theory.
See Fielder v. State, 683 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1985), rev'd on other grounds,
756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Impressively, the court of appeals in Fielder recog-
nized that:
The battered woman experiences feelings of anxiety, self-blame, isolation and fear.
She lives in a state of fear; the constant fear of being subjected to further violence by
her batterer. When and if the battered woman strikes back at her batterer, often kill-
ing him, it usually occurs in one of two situations: 1) in direct response to provocation
or aggression by the batterer; or 2) pursuant to no direct provocation, but out of a
desire to be free from the situation and safe from her tormentor. In both situations, it
can fairly be said that the battered woman perceives herself as acting in self-defense.
Where the defendant acts in the absence of provocation it is obvious that testimony on
the battered woman syndrome would be relevant to show the reasonableness of the
defendant's fears and of her perceptions that such acts were necessary to protect her-
self under the circumstances.
Id. at 587-88.
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With respect to a defense of "self-defense." the respondents were
asked if the "imminent danger" requirement should be waived for wo-
men victims of domestic violence. Here the answers differed significantly
between the sexes. For example, while 23% of the men and 19% of the
women agreed with waiving such a requirement in the context of domes-
tic violence victims, 15% of the women compared to 33% of the men did
not agree with such a waiver. Moreover, while 30% of the women agreed
that the waiver should be given at least in some cases, only 13% of the
men concurred.
The respondents were also asked if they agreed with the enactment of
special laws and provisions which would give women victims of domestic
violence a specific legal defense when and if they were to kill their
abuser. The survey found a varying amount of support for such a
measure.
35-1 - ....
30 YN Ts Cas b
25- --
20- .32 33 __
15-1 25 25:al
10 - 17-- ]Fme
5.
Yes N o To some Case by
extent case basis
FIGURE VIII: SUPPORT LEGISLATION CREAIING, A DEFENSE FOR
WOMEN WHO KILL THEIR ABUSERS
Finally, the respondents were also asked if they would have the same
opinion to the above cited question if, instead, the husband were the one
who killed his wife because of her violence against him. The survey
found that 79% of males and 85% of females would still support the crea-
tion of a specific legal defense for the victims of such violence.
VI. ABORTION AND REPRODUCrIVE RiI.iTs
In her recently published casebook, Sex Equalit. y 2 Professor Catha-
rine A. MacKinnon introduces the "Reproductive Control" chapter by
astutely observing,
112. SEX EQUALITY (Catharine A. MacKinnon ed.. 2001).
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An experience of personal joy, pride, meaning, and satisfaction for
many women, motherhood can also, under conditions of sex inequal-
ity, bring exploitation and abuse, confinement to breeding and serv-
ing, constricted participation in public life, material deprivation, and
dependency sealed within a subordinate, narrow, and impoverished
position in society. 13
As eloquently expressed and captured by this passage, it is clear that
the issue of women's reproductive rights remains a complex and difficult
issue with enormously significant and sensitive legal, social and political
ramifications. Much of the controversy surrounding the issue of repro-
ductive rights continues to center on the seminal issue of abortion - in-
cluding whether, how and when abortions should be allowed, and who
should be the primary decision-maker(s) in this context.
While the United States Supreme Court's 1973 landmark ruling in Roe
v. Wade,114 established that a woman's decision whether to terminate her
pregnancy is a constitutionally protected "fundamental right" under the
14th Amendment's "concept of personal liberty and restriction on state
action,"' this ruling has neither been the definitive nor final legal pro-
nouncement on this matter." 6 In one of the more significant cases fol-
113. Id. at 1191; see also Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism,
Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 197 (2001) (theorizing that "saying no to sex" is
the same as "saying yes to power"); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality
Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1319-20 (1991) (exploring how only women can be disad-
vantaged by not being allowed a legal abortion); Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problen"
Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1737-38 (1991)
(recounting examples of how women were regarded as breeding stock); Dorothy E. Rob-
erts. Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 ANt. U. J. GENDER SoC.
POL'Y & L. 1, 4 (1993) (expressing how a pregnant black teenager experiences self-affirma-
tion while society deems her position as self-inflicted poverty). See generally Cheryl 1.
Harris, Finding Sojourner's Truth: Race, Gender, and the Institution of Property, 18 CAR-
Dozo L. REV. 309, 337 (recalling how the sale of slave children denied subordinated slaves
the joys of motherhood).
114. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
115. Id. at 153 (White, J., concurring in result). See generally Stephanie Lee Black,
Comment, Competing Interests in the Fetus: A Look into Parental Rights After Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 987, 1004 (1993); Andrea M. Sharrin.
Note, Potential Fathers and Abortion: A Woman's Womb Is Not a Man's Castle. 55 BRoOK.
L. REV. 1359, 1366 (1990).
116. Most recently, for example, by a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court struck down a
Nebraska statute which banned the so-called "partial birth abortion." See Stenberg v. Car-
hart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); see also Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 996 n.3 (5th Cir.
1986) (declaring that lower courts "are not obliged to give expansive readings to a jurispru-
dence that the whole world knows is swirling in uncertainty"). See generally Elsa M. Shart-
sis, Casey and Abortion Rights in Michigan, 10 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 313, 320-325 (1993)
(discussing cases which followed Roe); Selina K. Hewitt, Note, Hodgson v. Minnesota:
Chipping Away at Roe v. Wade in the Aftermath of Webster, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 955, 962
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lowing Roe, the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,"7 refused to overrule Roe, and instead explicitly
upheld the "central holding" of the case, declaring. "[t~he woman's right
to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central principle
of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot
renounce."118
In Casey, the Court entertained constitutional challenges to five provi-
sions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982." ' While reaf-
firming the central holding in Roe, the Case' court nevertheless took
issue with one of Roe's fundamental premises. In Roe, the Court held
that as the viability of the fetus to live outside of the womb increased, the
state's necessary "compelling" interest in regulating the matter corre-
spondingly increased.120 Continuing further, the Roe Court established a
trimester framework wherein the state's interest in a woman's pregnancy
is different, and greater, in each of the successive 12-week trimesters of
pregnancy.12
1
(1991) (postulating that Roe allowed states to regulate abortion if they could articulate and
demonstrate a compelling reason).
117. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
118. See id. at 871. Undeterred by the Supreme Court's persistent refusal to overrule
Roe's "central holding." however, a multitude of other policies and legislation, both state
and federal, have been enacted in an effort to protect the fetus. In one recent Supreme
Court ruling, for example. the Supreme Court struck down a public hospital's practice of
testing its pregnant clients for drugs and reporting the results to the police as an unreason-
able search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67 (2001): see also Cuellar v. State. 957 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi
1997) (involving challenge to state statute by defendant convicted of intoxication man-
slaughter and sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment for causing the death of a fetus in
the mother's womb): Christa J. Richer. Note. Feral Abuse Law: Punitive Approach and tie
Honorable Status of Motherhood. 50 SYRACUtSE L. Rt-v. 1127 (2000): Dorothy E. Roberts,
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and tle Right of
Privacy, 104 HARV. L. RE'. 1419 (1991): David M. Smolin. The Jurisprudence of Prvacy in
a Splintered Supreme Court. 75 MARQ. L. REV. 975. 975 (1992). At the federal level. Con-
gress is currently entertaining legislation which would make it a crime to harm a fetus. See
Unborn Victims of Violence Act. H.R. 503, 107th Cong. 1st Sess. (20U1I.
119. The five provisions required the following: i) Section 3205 required that a woman
seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the procedure and that she be
provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion was performed; ii)
Section 3206 required that a minor obtain the informed consent of at least one parent. but
provided a judicial bypass option if the minor did not wish to or could not obtain the
necessary parental consent: iii) Section 3209 (spousal notice) is described more fully in the
text herein; iv) Section 3203 addressed and defined "medical emergency" which in turn
provided an exemption from Sections 3205. 3206. and 3209; and v) Sections 3207(b),
3214(a) and 3214() imposed certain reporting requirements on facilities that prov ided
abortion services. See Casey. 505 U.S. at 844.
120. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63.
121. See id. at 164-65.
2Ol1]
THE SCHOLAR
Significantly, the Joint Opinion"' in Casey declared, "We reject the
trimester framework, which we do not consider to be part of the essential
holding of Roe.' ,123 While rejecting the trimester framework, however,
these three justices nevertheless affirmed the correctness of Roe's focus
on the issue of viability, declaring, "We conclude the line should be drawn
at viability, so that before that time the woman has a right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy . . . and there is no line other than viability
which is more workable."1
24
The Joint Opinion also determined that "strict scrutiny" was no longer
the appropriate standard of review in the context of abortion rights, and
instead announced a new "undue burden" standard. 25  Applying the
newly articulated "undue burden" standard to each of the five provisions
at issue in the case, the Court upheld four of the provisions, and struck
down only one, Section 3209-the spousal notice provision. Section 3209
required that unless certain exceptions applied-generally domestic vio-
lence and cruelty-a married woman had to sign a statement that her
husband had been notified of her intended abortion. 26 A physician per-
122. Perhaps as evidence of the divisiveness of the issue, the Casey ruling was issued
in a very splintered manner without a traditional majority and/or plurality opinion of the
Court. Instead, the main opinion was issued by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter
and referred to as the "Joint Opinion." See Casey, 505 U.S. at 840. Portions, but by no
means all, of the Joint Opinion were then joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Justice
Stevens delivered an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part with the Joint Opin-
ion. See id. at 911. Justice Blackmun delivered an opinion concurring in part, concurring
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part with the Joint Opinion. See id. at 922. Chief
Justice Rehnquist delivered an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part, which was joined by Justices White, Scalia and Thomas. See id. at 944. Finally, Justice
Scalia delivered an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in
which he was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices White and Thomas. See id. at 979.
123. Id. at 873 (O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., joint opinion).
124. Id. at 870 (O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., joint opinion).
125. On this point, the Joint Opinion determined,
The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right
itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to pro-
cure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where state regulation im-
poses an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of
the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. ...
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation
has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.
Id. at 874 (O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., joint opinion) (emphasis added).
126. See id. at 844 (O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., joint opinion). A woman also
had the option of signing a statement certifying that her husband was not the man who
impregnated her; that her husband could not be located; that the pregnancy was the result
of spousal sexual assault which she had reported; or that the woman believed that notifying
her husband would cause him or someone else to inflict bodily injury upon her. See id. at
908-09 (O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ., appendix to joint opinion).
[Vol. 3:157
THE CHALLENGE OF GENDER AND LAW
forming an abortion upon a married woman, without the appropriate
signed statement, was subject to having his or her license revoked, and
liability to the husband for money damages.' 27 After reviewing much of
the data with respect to domestic violence and family violence against
children, the Joint Opinion, joined by Justices Stevens and Blackmun,
struck down Section 3209. In so doing, the five justices forcefully de-
clared, "The unfortunate yet persisting conditions we document above
will mean that in a large fraction of the cases in which [Section] 3209 is
relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to
undergo an abortion. It is an undue burden, and therefore, invalid. '
St. Mar's Law Survey Results
Despite the unquestionable and sustained longevity of the Roe deci-
sion, much of the controversy in the reproductive rights arena continues
to revolve around the issue of whether, despite its-albeit limited-legal-
ity, abortion is the moral equivalent of murder. Toward this end, the St.
Mary's survey asked respondents whether they believed abortion consti-
tuted the murder of a human being. The survey found that 38% of the
men and 28% of the women agreed that abortion constituted murder. By
comparison, 33% of the men and 39% of the women indicated that they
would first consider the circumstances before determining whether a par-
ticular abortion constituted murder.
With respect to Roe's trimester framework rejected by the Joint Opin-
ion authors in Casey, the respondents in the survey were asked at what
point, if ever, it was appropriate for the government to step in and pro-
hibit abortions. Respondents were given the following six choices: 1) first
trimester, 2) second trimester, 3) third trimester, 4) never, 5) "'do not
know", 6) "will consider the circumstances." In addition, a seventh op-
tion-"always"--was not a part of the survey, but was nevertheless added
by a significant number of the respondents and is, therefore, part of the
reported data.
As the chart below demonstrates, there was a wide and interesting vari-
ance and distribution of the respondents' answers. Perhaps the most
noteworthy result was the dramatic difference between men and women
in their respective number one choices. The highest answcr chosen by
men, and the highest answer chosen overall-45 percent of all male re-
spondents-was the "will consider the circumstances" option. For wo-
men, by comparison, the highest answer chosen-27 percent of all female
respondents-was the "third trimester" option.
127. See id. at 887-88 (O'Connor. Kennedy & Souter. JJ., joint opinion).
128. Id. at 897 (O'Connor. Kenned' & Souter. JJ.. joint opinion).
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FIGURE IXE WHEN SHOULD GOVERNMENT PROHIBIT ABORTION?
Finally, with respect to the difficult issues revolving around decision-
making authority and spousal notice, respondents were asked who should
decide whether to terminate a pregnancy. The survey found that 72% of
the men and 46% of the women agreed that both the father and the
mother should decide this issue together. Surprising to the authors, only
53% of the women agreed that the woman alone should be able to make
this decision without consulting the father.
VII. CONCLUSION
In 1994, the influential article Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Exper-
iences at One Ivy League Law School was published by the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review1 29 As with the instant article, Becoming Gen-
tlemen, and the resulting book, I3 ° actually grew out of an initial student
project by a first-year student, Ann Bartow, at the University of Penn-
sylvania.' 1 I Since the publication of Becoming Gentlemen, a great deal of
similar and related literature documenting and chronicling women's ex-
129. Guiner et al., supra note 7.
130. LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN. LAW S(cflOOL, ANt) IN-
STITUJTIONAL CHANGE (1997).
131. See Bartow. supra note 7.
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periences in legal education and the legal workforce has followed.' - -
Most recently, the May 2001 volume of the University of Kansas Law
Review published a symposium issue focused broadly on women's exper-
iences with the American legal system.' 33 In this symposium issue, Ann
Bartow, now herself a professor of law, contributes an update piece to
Becoming Gentlemen, entitled Still Not Behaving Like Gentlemen.' -' In
this piece, Professor Bartow concludes,
Becoming Gentlemen, and most of the similar scholarship that pre-
dated or followed it, was predicated not on disgracing or dismantling
law schools, but on improving them by identifying problems, positing
solutions, and encouraging additional research. 
35
As discussed earlier, while the instant work touches upon women's ex-
periences at one law school, it also goes beyond to survey both women
and men law students' opinions on a variety of complex and controversial
legal issues of particular concern to women. In this way, we can perhaps
begin to understand better how those intimately involved with the legal
system - law students who will become lawyers, judges, and perhaps leg-
islators - and the views that they hold, affect the ways in which laws and
policy that most directly affect women in the United States are ultimately
constructed, interpreted and enforced.
It is our hope, therefore, that this work is responsive to Professor Ann
Bartow's recently articulated aspiration for continued dialogue and re-
search on these issues. Moreover, it is also our hope that our contribu-
tion to this body of literature will inspire others to pursue additional
research that is not similarly restricted by our post-survey-administration
analysis of the data. Because it was not until the data from this student
project began to come in that we realized we had the beginnings of a
significant and meaningful contribution, it was also not until such time
that we experienced an epiphany regarding what we would have done
differently in terms of providing for better construction of the survey and
analysis of the data so that the results would rise to the statistically mean-
ingful level - something which we quite simply did not consider when this
effort began as a class project. Recognizing these restrictions and limita-
tions, we nevertheless view our results as important, informative, and
worthy of sharing with others. Finally, we invite and hope to inspire
132. See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock. Foreword: A Real Revolution. 49 Kl,'N. L R v,
719 n.2 (2001).
133. See Symposium, Women and the Legal Profiession: Past and Future. 49 Kv,',. L
REv. 719 (2001).
134. See Bartow, supra note 7.
135. Id. at 884.
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others to continue, and perhaps build upon, this work in a more exacting
manner.
